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Abstract  
 
This paper contributes to analyses of sustainable enterprise with focus on quality of present and 
future employment, maintenance of human capital and constituting characteristics of institutional 
arrangements between the social partners. We add by proving that a specific option from the 
toolkit of flexible work schedules reduces unemployment risk over the business cycle, while 
providing mutual insurance of employers and employees. In labor market practice this option is 
known as working time accounts. Working time accounts are exceptionally widespread and well-
institutionalized  in  Germany.  We  also  introduce  a  risk  elimination  model  of  working  time 
accounts and thus contribute to closing the jobs miracle research gap that has become evident 
since the global financial and economic crisis. 
 
Keywords:  German  Labor  Market  Miracle,  Working  Time  Accounts,  Mutual  Insurance, 
Stochastic Dominance Rules, Business Cycle 
 
 
 
1. Introduction   
 
The global financial and economic crisis 2008-09 has been characterized by a massive global 
downturn with lack of demand. The expression most frequently addressed to the global lack of 
demand phenomenon is the term Great Recession (Islam and Verick, 2011). The subsequent 
transmission of the output shock to labor demand, measured by responsiveness of employment 
and  unemployment,  was  unexpectedly  muted.  The  muted  responsiveness  phenomenon 
challenges, inter alia, Okun’s Law, the fundamental empirical relation that is usually detected 
between  output  changes  and  unemployment  changes,  and  points  to  labor  market  miracles 
associated with the Great Recession (Cazes and Verick, 2011; IMF, 2010; Elsby et al. 2010; 
Okun, 1962). 
Several labor markets provided considerable shock absorption in terms of maintenance 
of human capital and jobs safeguarding. In addition, there is strong evidence for cross-country 
differences in the extent of the labor market miracle, with the German labor market miracle 
being exceptional (Burda and Hunt, 2011; ILO, 2011; OECD, 2010; Boysen-Hogrefe and Groll, 
2010). Thus, the Great Recession can be studied as implementing a natural experiment in labor 
markets and workplace relations, disclosing considerable labor hoarding with retaining of job 
slots in firms and sustaining of household’s disposable income (Carstensen, 2013).  
These findings raised the question of supporting factors for labor market cushioning and 
sustainable  enterprise  effects.  Especially  the  German  labor  market  miracle  is  not  finally 
resolved. This paper contributes to closing the labor market miracle research gap and adds to  
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sustainable  enterprise  analysis  with  focus  on  quality  of  present  and  future  employment,  on 
maintenance of human capital over the cycle, and on the institutional arrangements between 
the  social  partners.  It  develops  a  theoretical model  of  adjusting  labor  input  in  response  to 
demand fluctuations with the objective to filling the research gap concerning determinants of 
labor market cushioning and differences in the cushioning capacity. 
Concerning employment cushioning effects, recent OECD research on labor market 
resilience, defined as the capacity to “weather economic downturns with limited social costs” 
(OECD,  2012a,  p.57)  is  supportive  of  a  distinctive  role  of  well-defined  institutions  in  the 
industrial relations surrounding. According to Gal et al. (2012), response heterogeneity is most 
important for differences in the downward adjustment dynamics and overall cushioning capacity 
of labor markets, while differences in industry structure and in the distribution of shocks across 
firms are less relevant. In other words, differences in the sensitivity of labor input to output 
shocks drive the jobs miracle. Using firm-level data and simulations, the OECD project also 
discloses the potential key role of collective and company-level wage bargaining in mitigating 
negative impacts of the Great Recession. 
To  our  knowledge,  a  consistent  theory  of  response  heterogeneity  and  associated 
institutions has not yet been developed. This paper adds by proving that a specific option from 
the  toolkit  of  flexible  working-hours  arrangements  unambiguously  lowers  a  worker’s 
unemployment risk over the business cycle. In labor market and enterprise practice, this specific 
option  has  become  known  as  working  time  accounts.  Working  time  accounts  are  usually 
enacted as a firm-level institution with reciprocal obligations of employer and employees. Such 
accounts are negotiated and settled in collective or firm-level agreements. Every single working 
time account establishes a unique matching to an employee (one-to-one matching) and enables 
inter-temporal shifting of individual working time over the business cycle. Thus, working time 
accounts  provide  labor  adjustment  along  the  intensive  margin,  where  the  corresponding 
adjustment of hours worked might, for example, result from temporary shifts in demand or a 
preferences shift over the course of work-life balancing. By construction, working time accounts 
ensure that excess hours and also time-off in lieu are tracked in a time banking system, while 
salaries remain unchanged. From an institutional perspective, moreover, a settlement period is 
negotiated over which realized and standard hours  on an individual time account obligatory 
equalize. 
Our point of departure is threefold. First, we utilize the natural experiment property of 
the global financial and economic crisis and its aftermath, including the “labor market resilience” 
outcome (OECD, 2012a, p.57), with resilience most obvious in the German labor market. In 
other words, we start with the German labor market miracle.
1 Second, we inspect the correlation 
between sustainable jobs safeguarding through flexible work sharing in working time accounts 
as a mutual insurance device and a quick recovery. Methodologically speaking, we make use of 
the  method  of  probability  mass  shifts  and  then  evaluate  outcomes  based  on  stochastic 
dominance rules. Third, we re-assess the political debate, which tends to overemphasize the 
cushioning capability of short-time work. 
The  key  contribution  of  this  paper  is  to  closing  the  existing  labor  market  miracle 
explanation gap by introducing a probability mass shift approach at the enterprise-level that 
proves  the  key  importance  of  working  time  accounts.  We  also  provide  an  institutional 
arrangements guideline for business, unions and society to facilitating potential introduction of 
this sustainable adjustment practice. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 points out the empirical evidence of labor 
market cushioning and muted unemployment responsiveness in OECD countries during the 
Great Recession and initial recovery. With respect to the German labor market miracle, section 
3  quantifies  the  relative importance  of  adjustment  along  the  hours  and  productivity margin. 
Section 4 introduces the risk elimination model of working time accounts and elaborates the 
mutual insurance institution property. Interestingly, the jobs safeguarding access point will be 
the disposable income sustaining property of such accounts. Section 5 concludes and proposes 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, the terms labor market miracle and jobs miracle are used interchangeable.  
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working time accounts as an employment and income stabilizing institution over the cycle with 
general cushioning effects. 
 
2. Labor Market Cushioning during Great Recession and Recovery 
 
This section provides an overview of the interplay between GDP changes and unemployment 
changes in the Great Recession and subsequent recovery. For the purpose of elucidating the 
existence  of  labor  market  miracles  in  general  and  of  the  German  labor  market  miracle  in 
particular,  data  from  the  following  OECD  sources  enter  the  overview:  Quarterly  National 
Accounts  Database,  OECD  Main  Economic  Indicators  Database  (MEI),  and  supplementary 
material  in  Annexes  2.A1  and  2.A2  of  Chapter  2  of  the  2012  OECD  Employment  Outlook 
(OECD, 2012b). For the sake of clarity, only countries with a total OECD-GDP share of at least 
0.8 percent are included in the analysis, provided the availability of data. 
One distinguishing feature of the Great Recession was an almost synchronized entry of 
affected economies into downturn, where the vast majority of peak dates is documented for 
2008Q1-Q3  with  associated  trough  dates  from  2008Q4  to  2009Q2  (Spain:  2009Q4)  and 
duration of crisis, measured by the number of quarters from peak date to trough date, ranging 
from one to five (Spain: seven). 
Figure 1 reflects the broad evidence for muted labor market response among OECD 
countries  and  gives  an  overview  of  country-specific  differences  in  average  labor  market 
adjustment to output shocks. With the exception of Spain, evidence of labor hoarding exists. 
 
 
Figure 1. Labor market cushioning and the great recession: General evidence for a 
miracle 
Notes:  Orange-colored  markers  reflect  labor  market  responses  during  crisis,  with  bullets  depicting  countries  with 
average  duration  of  downturn,  triangles  depicting  a  short  crisis  of  just  one  quarter,  and  hollow-diamonds  depicting 
sustained  downturns  of  at  least  five  quarters.  Blue-colored  markers  are  associated  to  labor  market  responses  to 
recovery  (from  trough  to  latest  available  quarter  in  2011),  with  bullets  denoting  countries  with  average  duration  of 
expansion, triangles depicting quick and sustaining recovery, and hollow-diamonds denoting delayed recovery. Sources: 
OECD (2012b), Tables 2.A1.1 and 2.A1.2, OECD Employment Outlook 2012, Chapter 2 (OECD, 2012a). 
 
As can be seen in the left part of the figure, during crisis the enormous loss in real GDP 
was accompanied by merely moderate increases in unemployment (left y-axis: “Change in the 
unemployment  rate  during  crisis”).  As  can  be  seen  from  the  y-axis  on  the  right-hand  side, 
labeled as “Change in unemployment rate during initial recovery”, recovery is accompanied by 
muted – and potentially lagged – reduction of unemployment. Notice that the right y-axis has 
been  rescaled  such  that  the  associated  OECD-averages  of  percentage  point  change  in 
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CRISIS
RECOVERY
output shock:
real GDP growth
(reference spell)
Δpersons in 
employment
(growth rate)
Δannual working time
per capita
(growth rate)
−	6.8%
(2008q1-
2009q1)
+	8.0%
(2009q1-
2011q3)
+	17,000
(0.04%, 2008-09)
+	191,000
(0.47%, 2009-10)
−	  .  hours
(-3.1%, 2008-09)
+	  .6 hours
(+2.0%, 2009-10)
unemployment during crisis (2.3) and during recovery (0.6) both share the same horizontal line 
(black-colored dash-dot line, Figure 1). 
The distinctive role of the German labor market during both crisis and recovery can be 
seen from the position of the D bullets relative their OECD-averages in crisis and recovery (the 
intersection of the dash-dot lines, respectively). While being severely affected by the decline in 
real GDP, Germany’s labor market more than absorbed the output shock: Over the four quarters 
of crisis and in contrast to all other countries, Germany’s unemployment rate slightly decreased, 
definitely  contradicting  Okun’s  relationship.  The  distinctive  role  of  Germany’s  labor  market 
continues  during  recovery,  exhibiting  considerable  levels  of  job  generation.  Altogether,  the 
German labor market miracle is relevant and a better understanding of the underlying factors 
might contribute important insights for potential lessons to be drawn in terms of appropriate 
labor market institutions aiming at quality of labor and maintenance of human capital. 
 
3. Adjustment Practice in Germany: Variation of Annual Working Hours 
 
In this section we inspect the relative importance of the different instruments within the menu of 
adjustment  practices  that  have  been  utilized  by  German  firms  in  the  context  of  the  global 
financial and economic crisis. In the subsequent calculation we make use of the following data 
sources and documentation of methods: IAB Establishment Panel Survey, Fuchs et al. (2012), 
IAB working time and volume of work tables, Bach and Koch (2003), Zapf (2012), WSI Works 
Council Survey; Zapf and Herzog-Stein (2011), Zapf and Brehmer (2010), Employer Survey on 
Operating Hours (ISO/sfs) and Carstensen (2013). 
 
3.1. Germany’s Labor Market Response: Dominance of Hours Adjustment 
 
Figure 2 elucidates the labor market responses to the GDP shift during Great Recession and 
recovery, pointing out that the adjustment of labor input was driven by downward and upward 
adjustment in the number of hours worked. The initial point of departure of this paper, the virtual 
employment stability in the German labor market during crisis, is confirmed: At the aggregate 
level  some  negligible increase  in  the  number  of  persons  employed  is  documented  (rise  by 
17,000 persons in employment, equivalent to employment growth by roughly 0.04 percent). 
Thus, labor-input adjustment in response to the negative demand shock (6.8 percent decline in 
real GDP) is concentrated in the intensive margin segment that varies average hours worked, 
with a documented decline in per capita annual working time by 43.6 hours, reflecting a fall by 
3.1 percent, and accompanied by a labor hoarding effect of a 2.5 percentage shrinkage of 
hourly labor productivity. 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
      
  
Figure 2. The response of the German labor market during crisis and recovery 
Notes: Corresponding reference spells for crisis and recovery output shocks are denoted in parentheses, data source: 
OECD (2012b), Tables 2.A1.1 and 2.A1.2. Data sources for change in annual employment and working time: Fuchs et 
al. (2012), own calculations. Persons in employment are measured by number of employees.  
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The  dominance  of  intensive  margin  adjustment  at  the  working  hours  level  remains 
during  initial  recovery.  Initial  recovery  is  accompanied  by  moderately  rising  employment 
(+191,000 persons, 2009-2010) at a growth rate of almost 0.5 percent, while average annual 
working time rose by almost 2 percent (+ 27.6 hours, 2009-2010). Hourly labor productivity co-
moves with an increase by about 1.4 percent, indicating a reversal of the labor hoarding effect 
during recovery. 
 
3.2. Variation of Average Annual Hours: Menu of Adjustment Practices 
 
From the preceding figure it is evident that in order to understand the German labor market 
miracle we need to unravel the process of downward and upward flexibility of worked hours as 
well as the relative importance of the corresponding adjustment instruments in the menu of 
adjustment practices. 
Figure 3 summarizes the percentage shares of related adjustment instruments in the 
hours adjustment menu in Germany and shows that the bulk of inter-annual flexibility of per 
capita working time in fact resulted from variation of four core instruments, accompanied by 
cycle-sensitive short-term absenteeism (CyABS). The core instruments are: (1) POVT: change 
in the extend of paid overtime work, (2) STW: variation of short-time work usage, (3) TWSH: 
introduction and termination of temporary work sharing arrangements at the company-level, and 
(4) WTA: rebalancing of working time accounts through hours withdrawal or hours accumulation 
in a time banking system (unique matches between individual worker and personal working time 
account). 
While overtime work, short-time work, and work sharing (temporary part-time work) are 
well-known in labor market practice, this is not always true for working time accounts. Let us, 
therefore, introduce the following explanation from Burda and Hunt (2011, p.299) as a working 
definition:  "The  system  of  working  time  accounts  (Arbeitszeitkonten)  allows  employers  the 
freedom to increase hours above standard hours with no immediate payment, as long as hours 
are deduced at some future time with no cut in take-home pay, leaving hours at the standard 
when averaged over a window of time. The number of hours the employer owes the worker, 
which may be negative, is tracked in the worker’s working time account." 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Figure 3. Instruments for labor market cushioning 
Notes: Cycle-sensitive absenteeism (CyABS) reverted the expansive effect of upward adjustment of hours resulting 
from recovery by about 14 percent; presuming the existence of some substitutive relation: Corresponding “adjusted for 
inter-annual deviation in short-term absenteeism” effect of working time accounts is depicted by WTA in panel B. Data 
sources: IAB working time and volume of work tables (Bach and Koch, 2003) for methodology), Fuchs et al. (2012), own 
calculations. 
 
Figure 3 consists of panels A and B: Panel A displays unadjusted percentage shares in 
the 43.6 hours decline in working time 2008-09 (stone-colored bars) as well as in the 27.6 hours 
increase of working time 2009-10 (blue-colored bars). We denote the left-hand side panel A as 
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unadjusted due to the property that it separately documents such labor hoarding and working 
hours effects that are imposed by inter-annual changes in the number of short-term sick-days 
(CyABS) and from structural reallocations of working time (RES), among the latter: changes in 
the ratio of part-time job slots. In contrast, panel B reports the same relative importance image 
but adjusted for inter-annual deviation in absenteeism and abstracting from RES. In particular, 
absenteeism-adjustment is operationalized by integrating rising short-term absenteeism during 
initial recovery into the withdrawal-of-hours-segment of movements on working time accounts. 
Finally, corresponding adjusted contribution of working time accounts is denoted by WTA. 
As can be seen in panel A of Figure 3, during crisis about 96 percent of aggregate 
decline in hours per worker are “explained” by the four core instruments, with an almost zero-
effect  of  absenteeism  (CyABS < −0.2)  and  a  minor  impact  of  remaining  influential  factors 
(RES = −4.3). During initial recovery the latter effect declines to 2.6 percent of total changes in 
annual working time, equivalent to a 0.7 hours increase in annual working time from 2009-10. 
With  absenteeism-adjusted  figures  we  recognize  in  panel  B  that  the  submenu  of 
traditional  policies  (paid  overtime  plus  short-time  work)  captures  about  45  percent  of  the 
downsizing  effect,  whereas  almost  52  percent  of  the  corresponding  43.6  hours  decline  in 
working time are captured by the submenu of the two modern institutions – (i) temporary work 
sharing TWSH plus (ii) working time accounts systems WTA –, both institutionalized at the 
company-level. Tentatively speaking, traditional policies attain about 87% of the labor hoarding 
capacity of the firm-level institutions. The picture during recovery is fairly similar, with 47 percent 
of upward adjustment being associated to the traditional instruments submenu and almost 52 
percent  of  it  being  imposed  by  the  submenu  of  firm-level  institutions.  The  corresponding 
capacity effect of traditional policies, relative the joint upward-flexibility-of-hours effect yielded by 
accumulation on working time accounts and temporary work sharing reversal, is 94 percent. In 
terms of over-the-cycle adjustment capacity of hours, mean aggregate contribution of working 
time accounts is roughly one quarter (24.4 percent), slightly exceeding over-the-cycle averages 
of short-time work (23.8 percent) and of paid overtime (22.8 percent). 
To summarize, adjustment evidence is not supportive of the conjecture of a dominating 
effect of short-time work, which maintains in the political debate. In fact, the joint contribution of 
working time accounts and temporary work sharing arrangements dominates.  
For assessing the potential link between TWSH and WTA recall that hours activities on 
working time accounts are equivalent to an extended, hence, generalized kind of work sharing: 
The term generalized addresses the constituting property of working-time banking schemes to 
embody coefficients of work sharing that exceed the value of one, compared to traditional work 
sharing that is associated to (temporary) part-time work schedules, i.e. restricted to sharing 
coefficients less than 1.  
Notice that during crisis the internal weight ratio of WTA to TWSH amounted to 0.55 
and roughly inverted to 1.53 during initial recovery. Cautiously speaking, under severe shocks 
these ratios might point to a tentative coherence between working time accounts adjustment 
and expansion on the one hand and between enacting of temporary work sharing in downturn 
on  the  other  hand.  Moreover, facing  the  global financial  and  economic  crisis,  a  substantial 
fraction  of  companies  introduced  temporary  work  sharing  agreements  as  supplementing 
exhausted  contingencies  of  flexibility  in  working  time  accounts,  subsequently  permitting 
transition into working time accounts systems. Through the ex-post lens of the quick recovery, 
such TWSH schemes temporarily extended the length of the period or window of time within 
worked hours must average standard hours. Here, supporting evidence from the recent IAB 
Establishment Panel Survey reveals that 10 percent of working time accounts systems that 
existed by the end of 2011 have been introduced since 2009 (Ellguth et al. 2013, p.3) and is, 
thus, consistent with the suspicion of masked WTA activity in the guise of TWSH. 
Altogether, Germany’s labor market evidence is consistent  with the hypothesis  of a 
crucial  contribution  of  working  time  accounts  to labor market  cushioning. In  contrast  to the 
majority of other economies, according time banking systems have been fully integrated as a 
labor market practice, which is utilized not only for adjustment purposes but often also as an 
institution  of  mutual  (unemployment)  insurance  between  employer  and  employee,  thereby 
improving the quality of employment and maintaining specific human capital (Eurofound, 2012).  
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Correspondingly, Germany’s industrial and workplace relations landscape is characterized by 
profound experience and a broad dissemination of WTA. Thus, labor economists have come to 
some consensus concerning a potential key role of working time accounts in the German labor 
market miracle (Carstensen, 2009 and 2013; Crimmann et al. 2010; Burda and Hunt, 2011). 
In order to understand the intuition behind labor adjustment along the intensive margin 
including the general potential of eliminating risk, the next subsection summarizes emergence, 
coverage, institutional design and cushioning behavior of working time accounts since the first 
pilot schemes in the early 1990s. 
 
3.3. Brief History of Working Time Accounts and Cushioning Capacity during GR 
 
From the preceding figure it is evident that in order to understand the German labor market 
miracle we need to unravel the process of downward and upward flexibility of worked hours as 
well as the relative importance of the corresponding adjustment instruments in the menu of 
adjustment practices. 
The history of working time accounts as a labor market institution began in the early 
1990s as an extension of flexitime schemes beyond daily flexibility. Labor Economists attributed 
the term Arbeitszeitkonten to such elaborated flexitime schemes. EIRO network of the European 
Union subsequently adopted the direct translation, namely working time accounts and initially 
located working time accounts in the annualized hours  sphere (Schulten, 1998; Kouzis and 
Kretsos, 2003).
2 Until today, international penetration rates of working time accounts are rather 
weak: “Flexitime schemes with the possibility to bank hours – so-called ‘working time accounts’ 
– are considered to be a form of flexibility that can meet the interest of both employers and 
employees. (…) working time accounts are generally still not commonly used. In the EU 27, only 
6% of companies offer such … time accounts.” (Eurofound, 2012, p.10). 
In Germany, however, respective coverage is remarkably strong, with more than one 
third  of firms  operating  working  time  accounts  and  more  than  any  second  employee  being 
eligible to inter-temporal time transfers (Ellguth et al. 2013). Also, the overwhelming majority of 
WTA systems is well-designed and well-institutionalized with respect to contract sophistication 
and reliability of mutual obligations of contract partners (Groß and Schwarz (2010), Groß, 2010). 
If operated as a labor market institution of adjustment along the intensive a margin a given 
working time accounts system determines the rules for inter-temporal shifting of worked hours. 
Associated arrangements are usually part of collective agreements (sector- or industry-level) or 
are  negotiated  at  the  company-level  between  management  and  employee  representatives. 
Typically treated in the same contract are accompanying components, among them job security 
commitments by employers like formal guarantees against involuntary layoff for a notable period 
of  time  (typically  two  years:  Tarifvertrag  zur  Beschäftigungssicherung,  see  also  Seifert  and 
Massa-Wirth, 2005). 
Figure 4 reports long standing experience and increasing incidence of working time 
accounts  in  Germany,  it  displays  constituting  characteristics  and  prevailing  institutional 
arrangements of WTA systems. Moreover, the amount of realized shock absorption during the 
Great Recession is documented. 
Increasing coverage and broad dissemination of WTA arrangements in German firms 
can be depicted from panel A of Figure 4. At emergence of the global financial and economic 
crisis almost one third of all companies were running a firm-level system of hours flexibility 
through inter-temporal transfers in working time accounts. Since prevalence of WTA rises with 
firm size, more than every second employee has been covered by a WTA contract at that time. 
Share of participating firms and of covered workers continued to rise in the aftermath of crisis: In 
2011  34  percent  of  firms  and  54  percent  of  employees  were  covered,  consistent  with  the 
observation that every tenth WTA system that existed by the end of 2011 had been introduced 
since 2009 (cf. Ellguth et al., 2013). 
 
                                                 
2 In the literature, working hours accounts and time-saving accounts appear as interchangeable terms.  
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Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
 
Figure 4. Dissemination of working time accounts - institutional design and cushioning 
behavior 
Notes: Note that WTA are typically settled as firm-specific or collective agreements, often in so called PECs (pacts for 
employment  and competitiveness, Seifert  and  Massa-Wirth, 2005). Coverage  data (2011)  taken from Ellguth et al., 
(2013, 3). Date sources: ISO/sfs Employer Survey on Operating Hours (bars (a)-(c)), IAB Establishment Panel Survey 
and WSI Works Council Survey (bars (d), (f)), IAB working time and volume of work tables (bar (e)). See also Zapf 
(2012), Zapf and Brehmer (2010), Groß (2010), Groß and Schwarz (2010). Notice that reported averages do not reflect 
the variety of existing systems. 
 
While it is useful and important to know the overall WTA coverage, with respect to the 
unprecedented  labor  market  cushioning  effect  it  is  also  crucial  to  inspect  the  constituting 
characteristics of existing WTA arrangements in terms of inter-temporal transfer allowance, time 
corridors over which individual hours and standard hours obligatory equalize, and incidence of 
no-layoff clauses. A first impression of such properties is given by the green-colored ELAB-bars 
in Figure 4 (panel A), which reflect the ratio of well-ruled and well-institutionalized WTA systems 
among all operated WTA arrangements over time. This ratio is remarkably high and, moreover, 
growing over time. In 2001 nearly two-thirds of all existing WTA arrangements were based on 
sophisticated contracts, while in the crisis year 2008-09 at least 77 percent of systems were 
ruled in sophisticated contracts, equating a 14 percentage point increase in contract elaboration 
incidence in just six years. 
The term sophisticated is not chosen arbitrarily. The standard reference Seifert and 
Massa-Wirth (2005) determines an existing WTA system as sophisticated if following elements 
are explicitly stated and well-defined in the associated contract:
3 (i) an upper bound for hours 
surpluses, i.e. the maximum amount of excess hours to be collected by an employee: Δℎ   
  , (ii) 
a lower bound for hours deficits, i.e. the maximum amount of hours that an employee at most 
owes the firm: Δℎ   
  , (iii) the settlement period, i.e. the length of the window of time over which 
individually worked hours and standard hours obligatory equalize: 	    .
4 From the institutional 
economics perspective WTA systems can be distinguished according to whether (iv) a contract 
provides job security for treated employees or not. Let indicator      capture the distinguishing 
property of providing (private) insurance against unemployment. 
The green bars in panel B of Figure 4 inform about this distinguishing property: These 
capture  the  2001  and  2007  percentage  shares  of  WTA  contracts  providing  such  a  formal 
guarantee  against  involuntary  layoffs.  In  addition  to  revealing  the  aggregate  propensity  of 
insuring employees against job loss, panel B informs about the empirical averages concerning 
the other constituting elements (i), (ii), and (iii) of working time accounts in Germany in bars (a) 
and (c): For upper and lower bounds, institutional practice allows an average upward scope for 
                                                 
3  For  corresponding  proofs  of  renegotiation-proofness  of  sophisticated  working  time  accounts  see 
Carstensen (2013). 
4  The  window  of  time      	  is  synonymously  denoted  as  settlement  period  (Carstensen,  2013,  20), 
alternatively as time account’s compensation period (Seifert, 2004, 2), or as reference period (Carstensen, 
2009, 2). 
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flexibility of about three working weeks (full-time equivalent) as well as an average downward 
flexibility  scope  of  almost  two  working  weeks  (provided  the  pre-adjustment  balance  of  that 
account had been zero). Expressed in the number of hours, the average working time account 
limits the maximum time deficit allowed for an employee to 63 working hours, while cumulated 
surpluses, i.e. the sum of time credits, of an employee are restricted to 103 hours (the (a)-bar in 
the figure). According to the overall philosophy of working time accounts, the marginal cost 
associated  to  inter-temporal  hours  shift  on  a  working  time  account  is  zero,  with  a  mean 
contracted settlement period of 38 weeks (the yellow (c)-bar). Notice that the unemployment 
insurance motive is indeed strong: 71 percent of working time accounts that existed in 2007 
embodied reciprocal insurance  with formal guarantees against layoffs in exchange for inter-
temporal hours flexibility (the green (b)-bar, as mentioned). 
Notice also that the representative employee in Germany covered by a WTA scheme 
went into crisis with a surplus of 72 hours on his/her account, equating a time-buffer of at least 
two working weeks (full-time equivalent, (f)-bar in the figure). With the severe GDP drop during 
crisis this time-buffer was exploited to a large extend, supporting the joint objective of firms and 
employees  of  mitigating  negative  employment  effects  resulting  from  the  shock,  eventually 
enabling labor hoarding without implementing short-time work schedules. The corresponding 
cushioning capacity can be seen in the right-hand side of panel B in Figure 4: The decline in 
annual working time per capita as imposed by drawing down WTA balances is measured by 
Δℎ      
  = 45 (reported by the (d)-bar). In other words, the average hours withdrawal from an 
existing  time  account  during  crisis  amounted  to  45  hours.  Despite  being  merely  anecdotal 
evidence, these 45 hours fairly coincide with the 44 hours decline in average annual working 
time that is measured at the aggregate level (reported by the (e)-bar, calculations based on IAB 
working time and volume of work tables). We suspect this almost coincidence to pointing out a 
more general mechanism behind the common strategy of jobs safeguarding and human capital 
maintenance during the global financial and economic crisis. This mechanism is expected to link 
macro-level labor market  policies  and  micro-level institutions.  At the moment,  we  leave  the 
detailed analysis of the latter issue to future research. 
In sum, through the lens of the great diffusion of working time accounts in Germany and 
the degree of sophistication, the overwhelming shocks mitigating capability of the labor market 
during the Great Recession appears logical. Since, by construction, WTA contracts moderate 
extensive margin adjustment of labor, they mitigate loss of human capital resulting from cyclical 
fluctuations. Cyclically speaking, downturn and recession go hand in hand with withdrawal of 
time  credits  and  accumulation  of  time  deficits,  while  during  expansion  we  expect  the 
accumulation of surplus hours and time credits on working time accounts. Notice that due to the 
property of perpetuating disposable income embodied in WTA systems, firms running such a 
system are basically enabled to accumulate liquidity during expansion that might be used in 
downturn. Descriptive evidence for this chain is rather striking (Figure 4). 
Concerning the evolution of working time accounts as a micro-level institution it is worth 
mentioning that from the very beginning WTA systems in Germany have been mutually set up 
by the social partners, even in their early experimental stages. Working time accounts have 
been “invented” in a period of greater decentralization of decision-making and responsibility with 
gradual  erosion  of  centralized  bargaining  arrangements.  Being  part  of  this  historical 
development, WTA arrangements were negotiated and stipulated as integrated company-level 
contracts that in turn for internal hours flexibility provided private insurance against involuntary 
unemployment  (Carstensen,  2000).  Associated  working  time  account  systems  internalized 
(re)allocative  shocks,  thereby  promoting  the  quality  of  present  and  future  employment  and 
contributing to sustainable enterprises. 
 
3.4. Maintenance of Human Capital over the Cycle 
 
Growing diffusion of multitasking and versatile work over the past decades with an increasing 
amalgamation  of  occupational  classifications  and  demarcation  crucially  altered  information 
processing capacity of centralized and sector-level bargaining with important consequences for 
the efficiency cost of negotiations (Lindbeck and Snower 2001). In line with reorganization of  
 
 
V. Carstensen / Eurasian Journal of Social Sciences, 1(1), 2013, 19-38 
 
 
 
28 
 
work, the German industrial and workplace relations system gradually decentralized collective 
bargaining, where collective settlements have been increasingly supplemented by firm-based 
contents,  among them  specific fringe  benefits,  additional  (efficiency)  wage  instruments,  and 
customized further training. A very essential content of the structured decentralization process 
are so called company-level pacts for employment into which working time accounts contracts 
are  often  integrated.
5  Such  settlements  provide  the  contractual  basis  for  firm-specific 
combinations of inter-temporal transfers of working time (resulting from demand fluctuation) with 
formal guarantees against layoff (due to operational reasons) and plant closure. 
While basic pay is still predominantly determined in collective bargaining at the industry- 
or  sector-level  between  unions  and  employer’s  associations,  issues  like  working  hours  and 
organization  of  work  schedules  have  yielded  importance  over  time  as  integral  part  of 
decentralized bargaining within the idiosyncratic context at the company-level. Decentralized 
bargaining  over  working  hours  (adjustment)  patterns  goes  hand  in  hand  with  strengthened 
involvement  of  employees  and  their  representatives  in  communication  and  decision-making 
processes.  In  fact,  inter-temporal  hours  flexibility  in  working  time  accounts  and  a  well-
institutionalized  system  of  information  and  communication  channels  define  a  key 
complementary subsystem of balanced packages of human resource management instruments. 
Moreover,  by  applying  methods  of  supermodular  optimization  it  can  be  shown  that  hours 
flexibility  and  transparency  yield  the  strongest  efficiency  gain  and  should  be,  therefore, 
considered as the initial subsystem within a holistic reorganization process (Carstensen, 2003). 
However, as long as shocks move within “well-behaved” bands of deviation with minor 
amplitudes and negligible scarcity of qualified human/knowledge capital, the task of identifying 
the  modern  firm  with  versatile  labor  and  superior  shocks  mitigating  behavior  is  almost 
hypothetical.  Even  worse,  during  expansion  the  associated  cushioning  capacity  is  rather 
misspecified  as  omitted  hiring  or  as  jobless  growth.  During  normal  downturn  decreases  in 
random  separation  might  be  misinterpreted  as  job  reallocation  inertia.  Unless  extraordinary 
developments  affect  output  markets,  the  full  potential  of  working  time  accounts  is  hardly 
recognizable. Consequently, the majority of international labor economists were not aware of 
the general risk eliminating potential of working time accounts, of their relevance as a company-
level labor market institution, and of enabling factors such as being enacted beforehand crisis. 
Here,  the  natural  experiment  imposed  by  the  global  financial  and  economic  crisis 
definitely changed the setting: The formerly hypothetical debate turned into real, implementing 
the two hollow-circled observations for Germany during recession and recovery as in Figure 1 
(orange-bullet/blue-bullet  D  marker,  respectively).  Muted-hiring-behavior  and  jobless-growth 
interpretation  were  then  replaced  by  jobs-safeguarding  and  missing-unemployment-increase 
interpretation of the unprecedented evidence of labor market resilience. 
Determinants of shocks mitigating behavior over the cycle and the relation between 
inter-temporal shifting of worked hours and labor market risk elimination are developed in the 
next section that also introduces our theoretical explanation for disclosing the German labor 
market miracle. 
 
4. The Risk Elimination Model of Working Time Accounts 
 
This section draws attention to the stochastic properties of inter-temporal shifting of hours with 
respect to the distinctive role of muting risk. The objective is to provide a testable theoretical 
approach  of  adjusting  labor  input  in  response  to  demand  fluctuations,  thereby  filling  the 
research gap of the German labor market miracle and associated determinants of differences in 
labor market cushioning capacity. The organization of the section is as follows: First and with 
strong reference to workplace relations practice, the basic institutional setting of working time 
                                                 
5  Under  the  impression  of  the  general  labor  market  objectives  and  reforms  proposed  by  the  Social-
Democratic/Green  government  in  the late  1990s,  empirical  IR literature  associated the  term  pacts for 
employment and competitiveness (Sisson (2001), Seifert and Massa-Wirth, 2005). Using data from the IAB 
Establishment Panel Survey, corresponding employment effects and impact on employment growth are 
studied in Bellmann et al. (2008), while  employment changes during crisis 2008-09 are addressed in 
Bellmann and Gerner (2012).  
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accounts is illustrated. Second, our risk elimination through inter-temporal hours transfers model 
is explored. Finally, the probability mass shift interpretation of the risk elimination result follows. 
As could be seen in both Figures 3 and 4, during recession working time has been 
transferred to future periods or accumulated surpluses from the past have been drawn down, 
imposing  phasing-down  of  accounts.  During  recovery  a  substantial  ratio  of  postponed  and 
deducted  working  time  was  retrieved  and  withdrawal  of  hours  has  been  reversed.  The 
associated  inter-temporal  reallocation  of  working  time  effectively  internalized  deviations  in 
output  demand.  Following  the  institutional  settings,  associated  activities  on  WTA  connect 
recession and recovery and, consequently, imply reciprocal risk elimination for workers and 
firms. Over the cycle and within the scope for hours deviation, WTA instantaneously internalize 
allocative  shocks  like  random  fluctuations  in  demand.  As  a  result,  relevant  part  of  cyclical 
variation of employment and of disposable incomes is absorbed. 
 
4.1. Working Time Accounts as a Reciprocal Labor Market Institution 
 
In Germany, collective and company-level bargaining experiences with working time accounts 
are  rich  and  long  lasting.  WTA  systems  are  firmly  integrated  into  workplace  and  industrial 
relations practice. Associated agreements are set up as comprehensive reciprocal institutions 
with mutual obligations of covered agents, namely employers and employees. Such sector- or 
company-level contracts insure workers against involuntary unemployment in turn for granting 
the employer the option of inter-temporally shifting working time.
6  
The distinguishing property of working time banking is the tracking of worked hours 
(deviations) in an individualized statement of account: the working time account WTA. Suppose 
that any single WTA denotes the following elements: 
 
  Identifier of associated employee   (one-to-one matching). 
  Remuneration package of employee (  ). 
  Contracted vector of standard hours (   ). 
  Settlement period (    ). 
  Contracted distribution of working time deviations (  
 ,  
 ) that also includes  
the overall scope for flexibility, the latter written as: Δℎ    = {Δℎ   
  ,Δℎ   
  	}. 
  Current WTA balance (aba ). 
  Enforceable guarantee against involuntary layoff, measured as  
indicator vector (    ). 
 
Formally, the working time account WTA for a particular individual writes as: 
 
(1)  WTA ∶=	{  ,	   ,    ,(  
 ,  
 ),aba ,    }, 
 
where  remuneration  vector     =    ,     ,  ,           comprises  fixed  and  possible 
variable/bonus components. The reference spells in the contracted vector of standard hours run 
from  short-termed  daily  reference  to  long-termed  annual  or  longer  reference  periods:      =
(ℎ  
  	,ℎ  
 	,ℎ  
 ,ℎ  
  ,⋯	), provided the restrictions as imposed by Hours of Work Acts are satisfied. 
Settlement period      defines the maximum window of time for worked hours and standard 
hours to equalize and is usually denoted in weeks. Like standard hours, downward adjustment 
capacity draws on a well-defined order of reference spells, with a strictly binding overall upper 
limit for deficit hours. The corresponding vector of realized hours deficits is written as   
 , with 
the strictly binding bound for cumulated hours the employee might owe the firm being displayed 
by Δℎ   
  . Correspondingly, upward adjustment capacity   
  is bounded from above, where the 
maximum number of cumulated surpluses is denoted as Δℎ   
  . Taken together, Δℎ   
   and 
Δℎ   
   determine the WTA’s scope for hours deviations, which we already know from Figure 4 
(the (a)-bar). 
                                                 
6 The idea of mutual insurance in working time accounts systems was introduced in Carstensen (2000).  
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Further,  current WTA  balance  aba   displays  the  actual  number  of  surplus  hours  or 
deficits  hours,  respectively,  as  existent  on  the  individual  working  time  account      .  Any 
positive  value  aba  > 0  indicates  a  time  credit  granted  by  employee     to  the  firm,  while  a 
negative aba  < 0 points out that, in contrast, worker   owes the employer working time. With – 
on average – accurate market expectations expected value of aba  is, of course, zero. Finally, 
jobs safeguarding appears as indicator variable     , with      = 1 documenting that a formal 
and  enforceable  guarantee  against  involuntary  layoff  is  part  of  the  working  time  account 
contract, eventually implementing (reciprocal) private unemployment insurance.
7 
 
4.2. Risk Elimination by Inter-temporal Hours Transfers 
 
An appropriate context for assessing the mutual insurance capability of well-defined shifting of 
working  time  between  periods  in  the  above  WTA  is  the  stochastic  environment  of  mean 
preserving  decreases  in  risk.  The  associated  analysis  is  that  of  second  order  stochastic 
dominance (Hadar and  Russel, 1969; Hanoch and Levy, 1969; and Rothschild and Stiglitz, 
1970; for surveys: Levy, 1992 and 2006; Eeckhoudt et al. 2005). Technically speaking, working 
time  accounts  introduce  probability  mass  shifts  on  the  risky  prospects  of,  for  example, 
employment or disposable income without altering the target function’s average.
8 
We  recapitulate  the  main  definitions  of  stochastic  dominance.  Notice  that  mean 
preserving decrease in risk and second order stochastic dominance are equivalent. 
 
DEFINITION 1 (stochastic dominance). For any two random variables   and   with support   and 
associated distribution functions  ( ) and  ( ) we say that   stochastically dominates   in 
the  
 
  (a) first order sense, written as   ≻     , iff  
1.   ( ) ≤  ( ), for all   ∈  , and  
2.  strict inequality holds for at least one  .  
  (b) second order sense, written as   ≻     , iff 
1.  ∫ [ ( ) −  ( )]   ≥ 0
 
     , for all   ∈  , and  
2.  strict inequality holds for at least one  .  
 
Next we will show that according to its unique nature the inter-temporal transfer of hours 
in working time accounts exactly matches the definition of second order stochastic dominance 
and such hours transfer will therefore be strictly preferred by all risk-averse agents. 
Suppose random fluctuations in demand. Draw attention to differences in company-
level policies of labor input adjustment, in particular to the sensitivity of jobs and disposable 
income to the output shock. Let us consider the following three distinctive transmission patterns 
of the output shock to labor: 
 
  The individual employment relation is sustained. An employee is remunerated 
dependent on output under the individual performance related payment system 
of piece rate pay: Output and disposable income vary with the shock, while jobs 
are stable. 
  The individual employment relation is sustained, where employees are covered 
by  a  working  time  accounts  contract  including  a  remuneration  system  that 
                                                 
7 Recall that in recent industrial and workplace relations practice WTA arrangements typically embody 
formal job guarantees: In 2007, 71 percent of arrangements in Germany exhibited a value      = 1 for the 
employment  insurance  indicator  variable.  Obviously,  strong  incidence  and  incentives  for  private 
unemployment insurance do exist. 
8 A more detailed definition and discussion of working time accounts as well as the extensive proof of the 
subsequent results can be found in Carstensen (2013) who, moreover, provides the proof that working 
time  accounts  as  a  mutual  insurance  device  are  self-enforcing  and  establish  a  renegotiation-proof 
(internal) labor market institution.  
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sustains  disposable  income  within  the  WTA’s  scope  for  hours  deviations: 
Worked hours vary with the demand shock, while jobs and disposable income 
stay the same.  
  Dependent on the shock, employment relations are separated or new workers 
are  hired  with,  for  simplicity,  EPL  being  either  not  effective  or  of  minor 
relevance: At the aggregate level, propensity of layoff and hiring varies with the 
shock, thus, implementing a correspondence of employment adjustment at the 
extensive margin. Disposable income varies accordingly over the cycle.  
 
For the three stylized adjustment patterns we write, respectively:  
 
  Output-driven inter-temporal adjustment of remuneration (PRP).  
  Output-driven inter-temporal transfer of working hours (WTA).  
  Output-driven inter-temporal labor turnover (SEPA).  
 
With output-driven adjustment of remuneration (PRP) adjustment of labor input occurs 
by output alignment of remuneration. With shrinking demand piece rate pay implies downward 
adjustment  of  remuneration,  while  expansion  of  demand  is  accompanied  by  an increase  in 
remuneration and, accordingly, in disposable income. Let     capture the random distribution of 
disposable income that is associated to PRP adjustment, and let   ( ) capture the respective 
cumulated distribution function. 
With output-driven labor turnover (SEPA) adjustment of labor input takes place through 
adapting  employment  by  immediate  separation  and  hiring. Write  the  random  distribution  of 
employment adjustment SEPA that is associated to such separation and hiring behavior as     
for the random variable itself and as   ( ) for the corresponding cumulated distribution function. 
With inter-temporal transfer of working hours (WTA), however, a contraction in labor 
input is imposed by temporarily working fewer hours, whereas employees work longer hours in 
times of expansive shocks, consequently implying temporary contraction and extension of labor 
input along the intensive margin. Associated hours movements, i.e. deviations, are tracked over 
time  in  the  individual  working  time  account.  Notice  that  remuneration  does  not  change  in 
response to hours deviations. Since mean working time is held constant over the settlement 
period, inter-temporal substitution of working longer hours and time-off in lieu is enabled, and 
within the contracted scope of hours flexibility of a working time account the number of workers 
is  stable,  despite  the  output  shock.  Let  us  denote  the  random  variable  of  employment 
adjustment outcomes under the WTA scheme as    for the random variable itself and as   ( ) 
for the associated distribution function. Further, we write    for the random variable of changes 
in disposable income imposed by WTA adjustment and   ( ) for the corresponding distribution 
function. As long as the hours impact of random demand fluctuation realizes within interval 
{  
 ,  
 }, neither disposable income is affected nor is employment: Hence, with working time 
accounts the number of employees as well as individual disposable income are sustained at 
their  expected  value,  eventually  alleviating  ups  and  downs  in  random  job  destruction  and 
creation. 
Given these preliminaries,     and    , with   = 1,2, exactly meet Definition 1 in terms of 
second order dominance and, further, establish the risk eliminating property of working time 
accounts. Subsequent Proposition 1 covers this critical property of inter-temporal transfer in 
working time accounts, stating that WTA automatically internalize reallocative shocks, thereby 
eliminating adverse effects of fluctuation in demand or output shocks. For simplicity, let us work 
with  symmetrical  shocks  and  one  month  as  reference  period.  Moreover,  suppose  interval 
{  
 ,  
 } =	{− ℎ ,+ ℎ } as flexibility allowance of hours, hence, the contracted WTA’s overall 
scope for flexibility. 
 
PROPOSITION  1  (risk  elimination).  Fix  symmetric  random variable      and let      stochastically 
dominate symmetric random variable     in the second order sense:     ≻       . In particular, 
suppose that     has been generated from     by a mean preserving decrease in risk, which  
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has been imposed by a shift of probability mass from tail regions    of    , with   =  , , to its 
center region  . Then, fix    as left-tail region of     and     as right-tail region of     such that: 
   ∶=         −   ,       ,     ∶=        ,       +    ,    > 0, and   = 1,2. Further, fix point interval 
  =          as the center region to which both tail-areas    and     are transferred, where 
transfer occurs through completely eliminating either associated tail probability mass by 
collapsing it to the mean.    
Then,     eliminates risk from     and will be preferred by any risk-averse agent. In particular, 
comparing  adjustment  prospect  Output-driven  inter-temporal  transfer  of  working  hours 
(WTA:    ),  on  the  one  hand,  with  prospect  Output-driven  inter-temporal  labor  turnover 
(SEPA:    ), one the other hand, reveals that well-defined hours adjustment in working time 
accounts eliminates unemployment risk of covered employees, since distribution function 
  ( ) satisfies the condition of second order dominating   ( ), where the latter is related to 
policy     of shock- and cycle-sensitive labor adjustment along the extensive margin.   
Risk elimination capacity of working time accounts is not restricted to exposure of workers 
to unemployment risk but generalizes to insuring individual disposable income over the 
cycle. Consequently, adjustment of labour input by Output-driven inter-temporal transfer of 
working hours (WTA:   ) eliminates risk on disposable income of covered employees in 
comparison to adjustment policy Output-driven inter-temporal adjustment of remuneration 
(PRP:    ), eventually implying that risk averse agents strictly prefer working time accounts 
as a mutual insurance device to competing institutions of flexibility such as piece rate pay 
compensation systems, integrated patterns of overtime work-short-time work sequences, 
and systems of (temporary) part-time work or temporary help services.  
 
Proof. Proving the risk eliminating property of working time accounts is straightforward 
from the set-up of      in (1) together with the notion of second order stochastic dominance 
(Definition 1). Figure 5 graphically reinforces the proof of disposable income insurance, while 
Figure  6  displays  the  unemployment  insurance  contents.  Both  figures,  for  simplicity  of 
exposition,  refer  to  standard  normally  distributed  outcomes  of firm’s  adjustment  behavior to 
short term shocks – as faced by the individual employee (changes in disposable income, Figure 
5)  and  by  the  workforce  at the  aggregate  level  (propensity  of  employment  status  changes, 
Figure 6). Moreover, the flexibility allowance for inter-temporal working time transfers, given by 
| ℎ |,  enforces  employment  and  disposable  income  insurance  over  precisely  interval    =
[  ,   ]  of  output  shocks,  with    =  −  	,+    =  −   ,+    ,  = 1,2,  on  the  support  of  the 
respective employment and disposable adjustment domain.
9 
As can be seen in Figure 5 the conditions for second order stochastic dominance of    
are  satisfied,  meaning  that  the  labor  market  adjustment  institution  working  time  accounts 
stochastically dominates the (originating) intensive margin adjustment institution of performance 
related payment. Notice that cumulative distribution function   ( ) depicts cumulated density of 
disposable income adjustment under WTA (blue colored curve), whereas   ( ) plots cumulated 
density of respective adjustment outcomes under straight output based pay PRP (dashed curve, 
orange-colored). Notice that outside the scope-of-flexibility interval ( [   ]−   , [   ]+   ) both 
distributions   ( ) and   ( ) do not differ: 
 
(2)  ∫ [  ( ) −   ( )]   ≥ 0
 
     , for all   ∈ ℝ and  
 
(3)  strict inequality holds for interval   ∈ ( [   ] −   , [   ]+   ) .  
 
                                                 
9  In  our  illustrations,  we  let  the  WTA  scope  of  hours  deviations  implement  disposable  income  and 
unemployment  insurance  within  the  one-standard-deviation  shock  interval.  Outside  this  interval,  also 
employees  covered  by  working  time  accounts  face  unemployment  risk,  provided  all  surpluses  in  the 
account are drawn down to zero.  
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Property (2) is straightforward and property (3) is evident if we inspect the difference 
  ( ) −   ( ) over the WTA-scope-for-hours-deviation interval ( [   ]−   , [   ] +   ).   ( ) −
  ( ) is non-negative over the entire support, increases to its maximum (.841 − .159) at point 
 [   ], and then decreases until   ( ) and   ( ) equalize again. Graphically, the area under the 
reference probability density function   ( ) (dotted curve) is cut and completely relocated to the 
expected value, here representing stable disposable income. 
 
 
Figure 5. Risk elimination through inter-temporal hours transfer in working time 
accounts: disposable income stabilization 
Notes: Reference distribution is the adjustment policy of output-driven inter-temporal adjustment of remuneration (PRP, 
piece rates as performance related payment), written as   ( ). Effects on disposable income of adjustment by inter-
temporal transfer of working hours are expressed by distribution    ( ).    ( ) differs from   ( ) by collapsing cumulated 
probability of interval [ [   ] −   , [   ] +   ] to the expected disposable income (introducing consumption smoothing). 
Collapsing of probability mass is enabled by inter-temporal substitution of working longer hours and time-off in lieu in 
working time accounts. 
 
 
Figure 6. Risk elimination through inter-temporal hours transfer in working time 
accounts: Employment stabilization 
Notes:  Reference  distribution  is  the  adjustment  policy  of  output-driven  labor  turnover  (SEPA,  extensive  margin 
adjustment), written as   ( ). Effects on employment status of adjustment by inter-temporal transfer of working hours 
are  expressed  by  distribution    ( ).    ( )  differs  from    ( )  by  collapsing  cumulated  probability  of  interval                 
[ [   ] −   , [   ] +   ]  to  the  expected  value,  i.e.  a  constant  employment  status  (retaining  of  jobs  for  job  holders). 
Collapsing of probability mass is enabled by inter-temporal substitution of working longer hours and time-off in lieu in 
working time accounts. 
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The proof of private unemployment insurance with working time accounts is exactly the 
same as known from equations (2) and (3). We just need to substitute subscript 1 by subscript 
2, denoting that we now compare WTA adjustment policy (  ) with SEPA adjustment policy (   ). 
In  sum,  each       internalizes  risk  from  its       counterpart,  ultimately  establishing  risk 
elimination in working time accounts. Very interestingly, working time accounts eliminate risk on 
disposable income as well as on employment. Thus, unravelling of the German labor market 
miracle roots in detecting the stable disposable income property or working time accounts. 
 
4.3. The Probability Mass Shift Interpretation of Working Time Accounts 
 
Risk elimination on a random variable is closely related to shifting probability mass from tail 
regions of the associated probability distribution function to the center region of that probability 
function with important impact on the shape of the post-shift distribution function. The kinks in 
Figures 5 and 6 display the corresponding shape effects of shifting probability mass in working 
time accounts. The probability mass  shift interpretation of mutual insurance in working time 
accounts facilitates an intuitive access to the key effects of risk elimination generated by inter-
temporal transfer of worked hours. 
Figure 7 illustrates the intuition of mitigating risk by imposing a shift of probability mass. 
Based on the three adjustment patterns introduced in 4.2. (PRP, WTA, and SEPA) it elucidates 
the dispersion reducing effect of a probability mass shift to the center. For ease of illustration we 
work with a discrete uniform distribution of five equally likely (output) outcomes to display a 
stylized business cycle and suppose any two outcomes being equidistant from each other. 
Panel  A  in  Figure  7  displays  the  risk  eliminating  effect  on  both  employment  and 
disposable income of working time accounts as a reciprocal insurance device. It can easily be 
seen that inter-temporal shifting of individual working time over the business cycle, first, absorbs 
risk in terms of uncertainty in disposable income: The individual remuneration path under piece-
rate  pay  scheme  PRP  in  panel  B  (left-hand  side,  bottom  part  of  the  figure)  displays  the 
transmission of output risk to disposable income, where the light grey bars depict such income 
risk realizations that are insured in working time accounts: In terms of the probability mass shift 
interpretation, the associated 40  percent of total probability would have been  shifted to the 
green bar, eventually adding up to a post-shift relative frequency of 60 percent of the expected 
value, provided WTA had been in use. 
Second,  time  transfers  that  are  organized  in  working  time  accounts  absorb 
unemployment risk in terms of the aggregate propensity of random job loss under the strict 
extensive margin adjustment strategy SEPA. Here, panel C (right-hand side, bottom part of the 
figure) illustrates the transmission of output shocks to increased unemployment risks imposed 
by job destruction and job creation resulting from a straight hiring and separation strategy of the 
firm.  Through  the  lens  of  the  probability  mass  shift  approach,  adjustment  scheme  SEPA 
determines a dispersion increasing effect with respect to the flexibility of hours pattern under the 
alternative adjustment strategy WTA. 
To summarize, the jobs and consumption stabilizing effect of working time accounts is 
likely a key element in explaining response heterogeneity of labor input to the global financial 
and economic crisis and in the extent of cross-country differences in the jobs miracle. 
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Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel C 
 
Figure 7. Comparative probability mass shift interpretation of adjustment institutions 
Notes: Mutual insurance of disposable income and employment relation in working time accounts systems (top panel A, 
cf. adjustment prospect inter-temporal transfer of working hours, WTA). Employment insurance at expense of stable 
income  with  performance  related  pay  systems  (bottom  panel  B:  inter-temporal  adjustment  of  remuneration,  PRP). 
Hardly cushioned transmission of output shocks to employment and to disposable income is associated to extensive 
margin adjustment (bottom panel C, cf. adjustment prospect inter-temporal labor turnover, SEPA). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The point of departure of this paper has been the muted labor market response to the severe 
output shocks during the Great Recession, to some extend characterized by substantial shock 
absorption  in  terms  of  jobs  safeguarding  or  retaining  of  human  capital  and  of  disposable 
income. In this respect, we studied the global financial and economic crisis as implementing a 
natural  experiment  in  labor  markets  and  workplace  relations,  disclosing  considerable  labor 
hoarding with retaining of job slots in firms and sustaining of household’s disposable income. In 
particular, this paper addressed the exceptional performance of Germany’s labor market and 
presented an approach to unravel the so called German labor market miracle. 
The major contribution of this paper is to detecting and explaining the risk eliminating 
effect that is inherent in inter-temporal transfer of worked hours in working time accounts. Based 
on a stochastic dominance model of probability mass shift, we were able to show that working 
time accounts establish a mutual insurance device between employers and employees. For 
employees,  coverage  by  a  working  time  accounts  system  provides  both,  insurance  of 
disposable income and private unemployment insurance. For firms, such a system provides 
smoothing of labor cost. Moreover, working time accounts improve the quality of present and 
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future  employment  relations,  supporting  sustainable  enterprises  and  availability  of  human 
capital. In Germany, working time accounts are well disseminated and sophisticated institutional 
arrangements between the social partners are pretty standard. 
The key contribution of this paper helped to closing the jobs miracle research gap that 
has become evident since the global financial and economic crisis, where we revisited the labor 
market miracle from  a  disposable  income  perspective.  Interestingly,  the  appropriate  access 
point to disclosing the sustaining jobs miracle is exactly the sustaining disposable income at 
work  property  that  is  implemented  by  working  time  accounts  by  construction.  Given  the 
revisiting access to the German labor market miracle, the rather unprecedented development of 
employment and disposable income in Germany prior to, during and in the aftermath of the 
world crisis has become clear and also fairly predictable. 
We conclude with the interpretation that the fact that inter-temporal transfer of worked 
hours  has  been  enacted  beforehand  crisis  -  i.e.  the  profound  experience  of  working  time 
accounts as a mutual insurance device in Germany’s industrial and workplace relations system - 
crucially contributed as context factor to the success of the employment stabilizing and even job 
generating effect during the Great Recession and its aftermath. Thus, employment and income 
stabilizing over the business cycle through mutual insurance in working time accounts points to 
an  institution  that  might  be  promising  for  other  economies  and  labor  markets  as  well,  in 
particular under conditions of growing scarcity of qualified labor. 
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